The New Formalism in Contract
David Charnyt
Over the past century, contract and commercial law have
been.prime sites for the debate about formalism in law. Two
stages are familiar. In the formalist moment of classical legal
thought, lawyers aspired to deduce the vast edifice of contractual
rules from an essentialist understanding of the nature of promise
and consent. Even details of performance and remedy, such as
the perfect tender rule or the preference for expectation damages,
were thought to be derivable from the essential nature of promissory obligation.
Equally familiar, the modernist or progressive phase of twentieth century American legal thought--epitomized by figures like
Holmes, Corbin, and Llewellyn-rejected the classical aspiration
to formality and dismantled ruthlessly the deductive system that
the classicists had constructed. The critique drew its impetus
from two complementary postulates. First, "abstract rules do not
decide concrete cases."' The claim to deduce outcomes from an
austere set of formal rules, grounded in an essentialist conception
of promissory consent, was a fake. Second, contract and commercial law should instead seek guidance from the concrete, everyday
perceptions and understandings of the transactors, 'men of affairs" whose innate or inarticulate understanding of commercial
needs guided practice and should provide the basis for the rules
coercively imposed by the law. At the limit, the law would simply
adopt or embody what these men of the world understood, instinctively, to be their transactional obligations. Most notably incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), this view
also provided a foundation for the "relational" approach to contract.
We are now in the midst of a third phase, a phase of "antiantiformalism" that seeks to discredit and displace Llewellyn's
claim to found commercial law in immanent commercial practice.
The central counterclaim is anti-incorporationist: even demonstrably efficient customs should not be legally enforceable; parties
may wish to have customs, or even express undertakings, ent Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Lochner v New York, 198 US 48, 69 (1908) (Holmes dissenting).
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forced by nonlegal sanctions, but not by the force of law.2 Further,
custom may often be inefficient and for that reason not a plausible candidate for legal enforcement. While buttressing these two
prongs of critique, Lisa Bernstein's current work adds a third, potentially the most devastating of all: that custom, in Llewellyn's
sense, simply does not exist.'
This accumulating body of argument seems powerfully to
dispose of the most ambitious incorporationist strategies. The
current situation therefore calls for reflection on the role of formalism in the current understanding in contract law. Where did
Llewellyn's antiformalism-an antiformalism based on reverence
for custom-fail? Does anti-antiformalism-that is, the demonstration that Llewellyn's antiformalist strategies are untenablelead us back to formalism? Do we yet have a prescription for a
formalist contract jurisprudence?
In addressing these questions, I wish to emphasize three
points. First, a crucial defect of Llewellyn's antiformalist program
lay in his failure to anticipate or appreciate the formalism of private enforcement systems: the rulemaking and adjudication of
the trade associations. Second, this trade association formalismthough an important discovery-does not counsel formalism in
commercial law generally; rather, it reflects, and takes advantage
of, the idiosyncratic institutional structures of the associations
themselves. Third, and most speculatively, these institutional
structures did not emerge or thrive because of efficiency advantages alone; they may have received powerful impetus from a
drive towards power by some traders and their managers, and
from changes in the dominant social conception of appropriate
economic organization.
The key notion for Llewellyn's antiformalism was that immanent local customs and practices could provide for fair and
reasonable results case-by-case. Appeal to custom would supply
the "situation sense"--responsiveness to the particularities of the
transaction before the court-that Llewellyn understood to be the
essence of common law adjudication.4 This resort to local and
' Work in this vein includes, for example, Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent BusinessNorms, 144 U Pa L Rev
1765 (1996); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contractsin the Courts:An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and JudicialStrategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271 (1992); David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Transactions,104 Harv L Rev 373 (1990); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperationin Long-Term Contracts,75 Cal L Rev 2005, 2039-46 (1987).
Lisa Bernstein, The QuestionableEmpirical Basis of Article 2"s IncorporationStrategy:A PreliminaryStudy, 66 U Chi L Rev 710 (1999).
" A good general introduction to Llewellyn's conception of adjudication is Todd D.
Rakoff, Implied Terms: Of "DefaultRules" and "Situation Sense," in Jack Beatson and
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situation-specific custom set itself in opposition to two types of
formal rationality. Enforcement of custom meant rejecting the
highly formalized rules of the classical law of sale, deduced from
basic notions of consent. Moreover, appeal to customary norms
would ward off the hegemony of private systems of bureaucratic
dominance: contracts of adhesion imposed by bureaucratized
transactors in their dealings with dispersed consumers or small
fIrms.5 From the perspective of "situation sense" adjudication, the
authority of the classical rules or of the '"modern" contract of adhesion would suffer a common defect: unresponsiveness to the
needs and expectations of the participants in the particular
transaction before the court. Most deeply, Llewellyn's antiformalist conception of custom responds to Weber's conception of rationalization and the "iron cage" of bureaucratic rule. The appeal
to custom would be an effective strategy for resisting the oppressions of bureaucratic rationalization-for helping transactors to
escape from the iron cage.
Llewellyn's antiformalist strategy apparently founders at two
crucial points. First, Llewellyn overestimated the coherence
among immanent local practices. It is surely an overstatement to
say that there are no customs in the sense contemplated by
Llewellyn. The evidence, to the contrary, indicates that there
were numerous local customs. This is hardly surprising: local
transactors were repeat dealers, often in direct personal contact;
they consequently could develop a relatively complete contingent
contract consisting of expressly bargained terms plus the understandings that arose between them or among all of the local
transactors. Rather, the key problem arises when one moves from
local to national markets. This move exposed the immense variation in custom across local markets, and even within single market types or markets for a single good. Again, in retrospect, this
hardly comes as a surprise. Many of the customs at issue are in
large measure arbitrary: customs about the referents of agreedupon terms, upon which the desideratum is simply a focal point
that prevents ambiguity or opportunistic insistence on purported
private meanings. Rules about transactional conventions also are
Daniel Friedmann, eds, Good Faithand Fault in ContractLaw 191 (Clarendon 1995).
' See generally Todd D. Rakoff, ContractsofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
Harv L Rev 1173 (1983) (arguing that the law concerning contracts of adhesion should be
revised to take account of consumers' actual understandings of such contracts). The reputed "oppressiveness" of contracts of adhesion can produce game-theoretic terms, as the
use of this contract type ma permit take-it-or-leave-it offers that include terms that parties will accept even though more efficient terms are available. See, for example, Avery
Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation,89 Mich L Rev 215, 272-92 (1990).
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focal points. Moreover, even for rules as to which there are efficiency advantages, the efficient rule might have differed widely
among local markets in the early part of the century. Particularly
for agricultural commodities, local conditions for production and
distribution-and, correlatively, appropriate contract ruleswould vary with the weather, local harvesting season, quality of
output, and the like.
Consequently, while local markets would provide a fertile soil
for the development of trade custom, the diversity and pluralism
that are likely to result among local markets spell disaster for
Llewellyn's project as advances in transportation, communication, and the organization of national firms spurred the union of
previously localized traders into a single national market.'
Llewellyn's view faced a paradox: the more fecund were local
markets at generating customary norms, the more difficulty
would arise when these markets were integrated into the national market system. Of course, as dense national trading networks developed, patterns of conduct among repeat dealers in the
national market might have become sufficiently well defined to
support the identification of "national" customs. But Lisa Bernstein's contribution to this Symposium7 makes clear that this
process had not progressed very far during the early to midtwentieth century-the period leading up to the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The work of the trade associations
might best be understood as an attempt to accelerate-or to substitute for-the more spontaneous development of national customs; importantly, however, Bernstein's evidence of the diversity
of customs suggests that it is unlikely that consensus on the essential features of transactions would have quickly emerged by
the mere spontaneous processes that apparently had sufficed to
govern transactions when markets were more localized. It would
have been unrealistic to expect that customs sufficient to specify
a complete contingent contract would have quickly emerged in
the absence of the trade associations' bureaucratic reorganization
of market governance. Ignoring the complex dynamics of custom
in a nationalizing market system, Llewellyn's antiformalist reliance on custom appears to express a nostalgia for an idealized,
perhaps mythical premodern age-for the intimate local communities of shared value and custom, enforced by knowledge, reputation, and ties of affectional loyalty--celebrated in classical so' A classic description of the national consolidation of American business is Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Belknap 1977).
' Bernstein, 66 U Chi L Rev 710 (cited in note 3).
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cial science by T6nnies and rediscovered in modern work by Ellickson among the cowboys of Shasta county.'
But there is no reason to think that Llewellyn would have
had any inherent objection to the development of custom by trade
association rulemaking. Rather, the surprise lies in the types of
rules promulgated by the associations. The second key failure of
Llewellyn's antiformalist strategy was his apparent assumption
that the trade practices themselves would be antiformalist. In
particular, the trade associations' approach to dispute resolution,
which in turn generated the relevant "custom," shows little evidence of the emphasis on case-by-case "situation sense" judgments, which Llewellyn took to be the essence of sound common
law judging. Incorporation of trade practices, of course, ceases to
be an antiformalist strategy if the trade practices are themselves
highly formalized. The sources of this formality-and hence what
factors ignorance of which led Llewellyn to his error-are an ambiguity to which we shall return. It is apparent that Llewellyn
thought that custom was somehow expressive of the attitudes,
preferences, and "mentality" of the transactors themselves, in a
way that no bureaucratic rulemaking authority could more than
roughly approximate. Were this the case, then local custom would
provide the key to escape from Weber's iron cage. What Llewellyn
apparently failed to anticipate was that the private trade associations themselves would prove as bureaucratic and formalistic as
their public counterparts. As the outcome of the national market
system, these organizations each established a bureaucracy for
policing its own markets and for herding recalcitrant members
into line. Perhaps even more than the emerging bureaucracy of
the same period,9 they embody the will towards formalization
that Weber saw as characteristic of the modern capitalist system.
In short, Llewellyn's antiformalism is a flop. The more
pressing question for the new formalists, however, is whether the
critique of Llewellyn-the triumphant anti-antiformalism of the
current work on commercial custom-provides the foundation for
a new, instrumentally based formalism in contract law. Does
anti-antiformalism lead us back to formalism?
As a preliminary matter it is worth emphasizing the difficulties that confront the new formalist, ironically, by the very virtue
of her methodological rigor. The new formalist properly rejects
the simple Hayekianism that would assert that the practices of

' Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard
1991).
' Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities,1877-1920 (Cambridge 1982).
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the merchant associations themselves should provide guidance as
to the practice of courts. Rather, the current approach radically
opposes Hayek in two senses: it is skeptical about the efficiency of
extant practice; and it rejects incorporationism even when practices appear to be efficient. The key point is that efficiency in one
enforcement setting does not imply efficiency in another: rather,
as the legal realists emphasized, remedies and procedures for
adjudication are crucial to the understanding of purportedly general substantive rights.
Consider, for example, the apparently formalist jurisprudence developed by the trade associations' adjudicatory apparatus, whose arbitral rules often exclude appeals to custom or
course of dealing. On one view, formalism in contract law would
find decisive support in the fact that the trade associations are
themselves formalist in their approach to contract. Their prescriptions for traders come in the form of fairly elaborate formal
stipulations; and their approach to dispute resolution tends to insist on mechanical application of these rules, to the exclusion of
evidence of local (regional or transaction-specific) variations in
custom or trader practice. In a sense, this argument turns
Llewellyn's own devices against him: if we are to follow the immanent understandings of those engaged in the practice, is not
this decisive evidence that those immanent understandings are
themselves formalist, or, perhaps more precisely, demand formalism in governance?
Unfortunately, things are not so simple. As background, one
needs to appreciate that Llewellyn's point of view depends upon a
fairly complex phenomenology of business practice. Llewellyn's
point of view need not suppose that merchants themselves would
adopt or endorse his judicial philosophy. Indeed, there would be
an element of contradiction if it did so: for just as business persons might be supposed to have a deeply immanent but inarticulate understanding, situationally defined, of appropriate local
practice, so might they be correspondingly ignorant of the appropriate practice for lawyers and law courts, whose everyday life
and practice is at some remove from the transactional life and
practice of the market. This remove generates the problem that
Llewellyn's antiformalist incorporationism sought to solve. By no
means would a poll of merchants or their testimony before a
commission show them to be Llewellynites: to the contrary, they
might well misunderstand the appropriate role that law could
play in their disputes. Thus, that merchants substantially resisted many of the Code innovations does not show that Llewellyn
was wrong. (Rather, as we will see momentarily, one can under-
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stand their opposition as a battle for power between two types of
institutions.)
In any event, the question for the resolute anti-antiformalist
is whether she can return to formalism under the guidance of the
trade associations' private legislative and adjudicative practices.
Particularly, Lisa Bernstein's path-breaking analytic framework
for custom cautions against any such ready conclusion. Her
analysis emphasizes the radical institutional and transactional
specificity of transactional norms. The relationship-specific customs of each transacting pair, for example, should not be enforced
by the trade association, as these customs depend on understandings specific to the individual traders in a relationship.
Correspondingly, it appears that the adjudicative approach of
the trade associations depended crucially on features that courts
could not replicate. One such feature is the private tribunals' expertise in applying the fairly complex and often arcane rule systems promulgated by their associations. We are clearly dealing
here with a form of professional expertise that common law
judges, of necessity generalists, cannot readily replicate. Indeed,
it may be that formalism and expertise go hand-in-hand: that is,
that a rule system highly elaborated, and achieving precision by
the use of technical terms, is the type of regime with which the
common law generalist-judge would be least prepared to deal.
This provides the rationale, say, for specialized tax courts (and,
partially, for patent courts as well).
A second feature that supports trade association formalism is
the ability to adjudicate prospectively. As Bernstein reports,
these tribunals frequently include in their opinions drafts of contract terms that should be incorporated into contracts to avoid future disputes. Note how this procedure lays the foundation for
formalism in the next round: the trade association adjudicator
can now insist that the dispute be resolved decisively by the presence or absence of a particular term, which, for the tribunal, has
a built-in imprimatur and a preannounced meaning. In contrast,
common law courts lack the institutional machinery for this prospective rulemaking: they are inexpert, they do not face contract
cases from any specific industry often enough to mold practice,
and they lack the means to communicate their decisions in a way
that would reach the full range of transactors.
This leads to a third, and in some ways the most intriguing,
feature of trade association formalism. Trade associations take
extraordinary measures to inculcate their views of trade practice
into the hearts and minds of ordinary traders. Not only are the
trade rules and arbitral rulings publicized for the benefit of
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members; the trade association also inculcates trade practice by
answering questions from members and sponsoring institutes
and training programs for traders. Traders who fail to comply
with trade practices may be subject to public reprobation or,
worse, expulsion from the association, with drastic social and
economic consequences.
In short, the trade associations are uniquely situated to implement a formalist strategy for specifying the terms of transaction. Neither their styles of adjudication nor their announced
rules present themselves as candidates for automatic incorporation in law. Faced with the repudiation of any incorporationist
strategy-including strategies that would incorporate formalism-the new formalist must look elsewhere for foundational material. Consider, at least provisionally, two accounts. A first account depicts formalism as an inevitable solution to the problems
of pluralism or complexity.' ° The story goes something like this:
transactors, as we have seen, have an extraordinarily diverse, irreconcilable set of expectations about each other's behavior and
conceptions of right transactional behavior. Often, when the relationship breaks down, it will turn out that the transactors have
been in disagreement or have had diverse understandings.
Transactors would not have discovered this lack of agreement in
advance, simply because transactors match up without incurring
(as it would be unreasonable to do) the enormous costs of assuring that they share common understandings on all particulars
that might affect their future relationship. Formalism, then,
would be a desirable-perhaps inevitable, or necessary, or conceptually required-solution to the problem of diverse, plural
transactional understandings. There is simply no alternative to
adopting a set of relatively formalized rules to govern commonly
arising aspects of transactions and to insisting that parties who
wish to depart from, or supplement, these rules do so by express
language-to formulate, contractually, their own "formally realizable" rules. Here, the move to formalism has particular appeal
because there is a readily available device in the contractual setting for closing the purported "gap" between the formally mandated rules and the underlying set of normative judgments: "consent" to the gap is plausibly inferred, at least arguably, from the
voluntary decision to enter into the transaction.

"' See Larry Alexander's contribution to this Symposium. Larry A. Alexander, 'With
Me, It's All er Nuthin": Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U Chi L Rev 530, 531-50
(1999).
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Whatever the force of the conceptual argument for formalism
in a general setting, there are distinctive difficulties with its
transfer to the realm of contract and commercial practice. It is
simply not clear in the present context that there is any "gain"
from the move to a more formalizable set of rules. If the gain consists of avoidance of controversy, then perhaps the best approach
would be to conduct more rather than less inquiry into the commitments and understandings of particular transactors. The
questions are fundamentally empirical. For example, knowing
that disputes would be resolved contextually, transactors in particular disputes might settle the disputes themselves, resolving
controversy without the need for recourse to the legal system.
Moreover, a more extensive inquiry into parties' expectations or
understanding might discover common understandings that the
formal rules had obscured. In the regulation of consensual transactions, then-contrary to Larry Alexander's depiction of the general operation of law""-the use of vague and open-ended standards may enable the courts to resolve apparent social conflicts,
rather than simply reviving them in a new guise.
The relevant considerations are perhaps best understood
in terms of the general economics of formalism in the face of diversity. Crisp formal rules save the courts the task of deciphering
reasonable expectations in particular circumstances-a task that
becomes more costly as understandings become more diverse. But
this invokes an instrumental dialectic whose indeterminacy is
now familiar. Although a set of simple formal rules saves on the
costs of administering the legal system, it may do so at the risk of
drastically increasing the costs of transacting, by requiring the
anticipation of numerous improbable contingencies or forcing
parties to avoid altogether transactions that might culminate in
punitive forfeitures as a result of mere small misunderstandings.
Again, the issues here are fundamentally empirical. Bernstein's data on trade disputes supply the formalist with some
support. An arresting finding is that courts often invoke trade
usage to resolve disputes on core issues that the parties might
have been expected to address by contract and that could have
been readily clarified by a contract term-indeed, that the various trade associations require to be identified by a contract term.
This is useful, but the dyed-in-the-wool antiformalist will object
that there is a bit of wisdom by hindsight-the french l'esprit de
l'escalier-atwork. Of course in retrospect,when the relationship
has broken down, one may realize that "slaw cabbage" is taken by
1 Id.
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some parties to mean "large cabbage." (One recalls Frigaliment,2
Judge Friendly's celebrated foray into the "chicken" question.)
Prospectively, the rule-set to inform parties how to draft to
cover all of the contingencies-requires precisely the sort of standardization apparently achievable either by large bureaucratized
repeat transactors who can impose their forms on all or by the essentially legislative and rule-elaborating work of the trade associations. Hence, the fairly complex specifications of what goes into
a contract' are the product of trade association rules. (Presumably, the litigants in Bernstein's sample of court trade custom
cases are either not members of such associations or were breaking their rules.) Trade associations clearly have a very substantial drafting advantage over individual transactors. But this
leaves unresolved the question whether the courts should "help
out" transactors who do not have the advantage of a trade association's rulemaking in the background. 4
Note too the antiformalist cast of transactors' reliance on
"wiseman" clauses to resolve difficulties in interpretation. The
suggestion is very much in the spirit of Llewellyn's enthusiasm
for merchant juries-that is, for dispute resolution by those endowed, again, with that immanent knowledge of business practice
that Llewellyn and Bernstein alike rightly consider the key to
understanding the proper structure of contract and commercial
law." In short, this is an anti-antiformalism that lends but tepid
support to the aspiration for a formalist dispute resolution.
A second take on the return of formalism would extend the
notion of the "endgame." In Bernstein's valuable account, an aspect of the relational specificity of custom is the commercial expectation that a distinctive set of rules applies to relationships
when they terminate."5 The practices of forgiveness and mutual
toleration that help transactors to maintain their relationships12 FrigalimentImporting Co

v B.N.S. InternationalSales Corp, 190 F Supp 116 (S D

NY 1960).
IS Bernstein, 66 U Chi L Rev at 747-48 (cited in note 3).
14 It is important to note here that the commercial law may influence not only the conduct of individual transactors, but also the activities of the trade associations. For example, it is well understood, at least in theory, that a formal rule may serve as a type of
"penalty default" that induces more careful transacting--disclosure of information, or the
drafting of a more precise term-by the parties themselves. But we have virtually no models for the analogous influence that the choice of legal rule may exert on the regulatory decisions of the trade associations. This is clearly an important topic for future research. (I
am indebted to Ed Morrison for bringing this point to my attention.)
"s Contrast the attitude of Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World
(Harvard 1995), which seems to propose that broad principles of contract can be deduced
from general principles without reference to specific practice at all.
" Bernstein, 144 U Pa L Rev at 1796-1815 (cited in note 2).
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to paper over small differences by tolerating minor good faith deviations-are extinguished when the conduct of one transactor
has been so egregious as to require the other to end the relationship. At that point, the transactors regress, as it were, to the
more primitive state in which they assert only their legally specified entitlements, without recourse to the moderating and civilizing influences of their long-standing practices of accommodation.
Ought the law to which the parties have recourse be particularly a formalist one? The endgame model clearly gives reason to think that the courts should not have recourse automatically to the norms that the parties had developed to apply to their
relationship when it was expected to last into the future. In that
respect, it is of a piece with the general anti-antiformalist strategy. But it would require a formalist leap of faith to conclude
therefore that we ought to return to the more austere version of
the common law of contract, with its insistence on perfect tender,
"literal" reading of contracts, and sharply defined measures of
expectation damages, including distinctive limitations on consequential damages. Might it not be plausible, alternatively, to
suggest that this signally important-economically and sociallymoment in the relationship deserves to be parsed in accordance
with an "all things considered" judgment of the competing claims
of the two transactors? After all, the most characteristic feature
of formalist adjudication is the sharp discontinuities it introduces
into the parties' rights: a one day delay may mean loss of the
transactor's business, a small or inadvertent error is equivalent
to the conflagration of a heap of goods. It is not entirely clear why
this approach is appropriate to the parsing out of the losses from
a relationship gone awry. When marriages fall apart, for example, we are inclined to divide gains and losses by an "all things
considered" approach, with a full reference to comparative fault,
personal needs, and other equitable factors (and this often even
in the presence of an antenuptial agreement).' 7 Of course these
commercial relationships are not marriages, but the analogy
points to the familiarity, the naturalness, of an alternative approach to relational settings. The depiction of an elaborate set of
relationship-promoting norms strengthens the analogy, for it reminds us that courts would be intervening, not in casual or
ephemeral transactional affairs but in the relatively rare and im1, See, for example, Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational

Contract, 84 Va L Rev 1225, 1271-81, 1306-26 (1998) (discussing various legal rules for the
distribution of marital assets upon divorce).
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portant event-the acrimonious collapse of a long-term relationship.
Of course, crucial to the assessment of the alternative approaches would be the incentives they create for the parties, both
before and after the contract is formed. Consider, as one example,
the case for protecting the transactor who relies on custom or on
course of dealing. Identifying and enforcing the custom incurs
large court costs, and particularly may encourage fake or perjured claims about customary usage. But refusing to enforce a
custom or a course of dealing may permit one party to act opportunistically against the other. We cannot assume that the first
transactor to cry "foul" does so in good faith; the opportunism lies
in the party's insisting on the literal terms of the contract, not because he legitimately wants the benefit of that term, but rather to
get out of a deal that has gone sour. Faced with the threat of opportunism, traders may forgo a transaction altogether;"8 or, if
they enter into the transaction, they may feel impelled to hew inefficiently to the formal letter of contract terms in circumstances
where custom would efficiently let them off the hook, thereby
saving performance costs for both buyers and sellers. Bernstein's
model of the endgame implicitly relies on the nonlegal sanctions
to deter this type of opportunism; but demonstrating the comparative advantage of nonlegal over legal enforcement clearly requires more evidence than we have now before us.19
The anti-antiformalist gives some support to the formalist
approach. First, the formalist might deny that there is a plausible
source for an "all things considered" judgment, other than some
highly formal legal rule that specifies entitlements. Where would
the "all things considered" judgment look for guidance, if not to
the very customs that purportedly are no longer appropriately
" More precisely, traders may seek a price adjustment to compensate them for the
risk of opportunism. In a market where some traders are opportunistic and some are honest, but where these traits cannot be identified prior to transacting, the resulting adverse
selection problem may prevent transactions from going forward.
" Omri Ben-Shahar's contribution to this Symposium demonstrates that, in a broad
range of circumstances, parties are indifferent to whether the law permits modification of
an express contract or a default rule through course of dealing. Omri Ben-Shahar, The
Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 781 (1999). BenShahar's result, though of fumdamental importance, does not resolve the issues here. As
Ben-Shahar observes, for example, the indifference result no longer holds when the contractual flexibility permitted by reliance on course of dealing enhances the value of the
contract for the party-say, by enabling a contract revision that would be costly to implement expressly. Id at 817-18. The indifference result also assumes that all deviations from
the express contract are costly to the promisee; in the opportunism story, in contrast, the
promisee is insisting on the express contract term to get out of a bad deal, not to get compensation for an injurious breach.
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taken as the standard of conduct for the relationship? But the
relationship norm would at least be relevant to tell one whether
the purported ground for ending the relationship is in fact valid.
Moreover, there are sources for an antiformalist, "all things considered" approach, aside from the record of the parties' prior
dealings: general norms of fairness (say, the restitutionary norm
that one pays for benefits that one took or a norm of equal sharing of some jointly incurred accident costs); bans on certain types
of intentional advantage-taking; 0 or, more dubiously in this context, considerations of need-a sort of "failing business" defense.2
Ironically, the anti-antiformalist account might be taken to
point to a reason-on substantive grounds-to disregard these
further factors for endgame situations, in favor of formal norms:
that the very punitive character of formal rules makes them seem
objectionable. The punitive character could serve an important
deterrent function. It would induce parties to exert care in their
choice of trading partners, in their drafting of contract terms, and
in their use of nonlegal mechanisms to control performance; and
it would encourage parties to adhere faithfully to their relational
obligations to avoid the disasters that await with the endgame
invocation of formal legal entitlements. The horrors of dealing
with the legal system would have a powerful in terrorem effect.
Again, though, this view would require conclusions substantially
beyond what is justified by our current understanding of the
"endgame." The view requires the formalist to conclude that the
more situationally oriented view of fault or appropriate punishment is simply impossible to implement or too costly to be worth
the effort. Moreover, it assumes that the punitive effects of formalism are at least roughly calculated to achieve an optimal level
of deterrence-a calculation that, if accurate, would be so only
randomly. Without further evidence on these points, the cases for
and against formalism remain in equipoise.
Stuck in this conceptual gridlock, the contract theorist legitimately asks after the causes and sources of the formalist impulse-after what one might call the "will to formality." An apparent source is expressed in the delightful doggerel that BernBut see David A. Weisbach, Formalismin the Tax Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 860 (1999)
(suggesting that anti-abuse provisions in the tax code may be designed merely to reduce
the code's complexity).
" Compare Judge Posner's discussion in Vande Zande v Wisconsin, 44 F3d 538, 543
(7th Cir 1995) (explaining the "failing company" defense in antitrust law and comparing it
to "undue hardship" under the Americans with Disabilities Act). Of course, the rationale
for this type of defense in the business context is a bit of a puzzle; perhaps such defenses
are efficient because saving the failing business avoids bankruptcy and reorganization
costs.
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stein quotes: "If I knew you and you knew me'Tis seldom we
would disagree/But never having yet clasped hands/Both often
fail to understand."22 Bad verse is often a symptom that some
deep social impulse is at work. Here there is pretty clearly the
yearning for the days when one transacted with one's neighborsthe days before the emergence of the national markets that in
turn gave rise, at least if one may draw the inference from the
sequence in Bernstein's historical account, to the trade associations' codification project. Codification here, as elsewhere in the
law itself, responds to the perception of the diffuseness and heterogeneity of local rules that develop in the common law style,
case-by-case or situation-by-situation. Such development was, as
Bernstein describes it-and as the poem nicely captures-plausible in settings in which transactors were part of a small community in which they really did know each other. Codification and
bureaucratization are responses to the loss of that local communal bond and the mutual understanding and sense of cooperativeness that comes with it. In addition, as in the codification
movement in the common law (for example, the work of the commissions on uniform laws), the imposition of uniformity suppresses the ongoing political conflict that would arise if one continued to try to formulate rules on a case-by-case basis.
Further, this new social formation involves a power grab by
the centralizing authority and its managers. Assessment of rational choice explanations here raises questions of nuance. It is
apparent that at least some transactors were protecting their
own interests, particularly during the private rulemaking sessions.? Further, when customs are uncertain or in flux, the distinction between rent seeking and honest disagreement will be
unclear, making it correspondingly difficult for the social norms
against self-serving bias to operate effectively during the rulemaking process. In these circumstances, perceptions and selfinterest have a fny
but reliable way of coinciding. Most fundamentally-and quite aside from the content of specific rulessome members of the industry would benefit more than others
from the process of formalization itself. The elaborate formal
codes, and the machinery of dispute resolution, discipline, and
indoctrination, were imposed against skepticism and strong
resistance. The imposers presumably had a strong commitment
to the project of imposing formal industry rules. In part, of

" Bernstein, 66 U Chi L Rev at 765 (cited in note 3).
"For example, see id at 736-37 nn 111-20 (discussing the silk industry).
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course, one has the dynamic of large and small firms that often
appears when a set of new regulations emerges.24 In the present
context, firms with well-developed bureaucracies and high volumes of transactions would benefit from greater formalization in
dealing with smaller and less capable transactional partners.
Further, these large firms might use the rules to garner rents by
reducing the volume of transactions in which rivals could engage.
Trade associations here are apparently serving the function of industry standard-setters-much like those associations that set
technological standards-and the evidence in both types of standard-setting points to substantial reason to fear rent-seeking behavior and sheer irrationality or arbitrariness in the wielding of
standard-setting power.'
But one might question whether these purely calculative motives suffice to account for the project of formalizing customs in
national trade standards. Perhaps we might speak here of a particular species of a will to power, a will towards formalization
that transcends the direct economic interest at stake. A mindset
that concludes that social rationality requires the imposition of
uniform rules, highly regularized practices, and the suppression
or marginalization of local variations and local inventiveness may
proceed ruthlessly without consulting the particular gains to be
achieved by the incremental steps towards formalization. Indeed,
in many instances-and apparently here-it is impossible to
speak of increments: the project must be concluded as a totality.
When one considers the elaborate apparatus by which the trade
associations formulate and enforce customs-including public
procedures for shaming and expulsion of deviants and boot camps
for inculcating new traders with the industry standard-one is
reminded of nothing so much as of Foucault's image of modern
disciplinary institutions, which continuously survey and monitor
their members and subject them to routines of training and discipline. The point is to subject individuals to the professionally
elaborated set of rules of conduct. We are at this point quite far
from the world of Llewellyn and Hayek, in which the immanent
practices of business persons arise inductively as they generalize

' Compare, for example, data on OSHA compliance costs, which are substantially
higher for smaller firms. See, for example, Ann P. Bartel and Lacy Glenn Thomas, Predation Through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Effects of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administrationand the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, 30 J L & Econ 239, 24246(1987).
"See, for example, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U Pa L Rev 595 (1995) (concluding that rules produced by private
lawmaking groups such as the ALI reflect the influence of dominant interest groups).
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from their own day-to-day experience with transactions in the
market. Instead, the customs come top-down, dictated by a bureaucratic apparatus centered on a private legislative body with
national scope. The pervasiveness of this rationalizing mindset
over diverse areas of social life in this century, and over diverse
cultures, tempts one to ask whether even the most subtle of economic models can display the complete case for these complex
systems of social control in terms of instrumental rationality
alone.
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